– Parameshvarananda
While monism is one of the central principles of Indian philosophies, philosophers interpret it differently from various schools. The most popular school of monism is the Advaita Vēdānta of Shaṅkarācārya. However, many Indian philosophers take exception to this school’s concept of monism. For example, Vallabhācārya, an ancient Vaishnavite philosopher, calls his own principle pure non-dualism (śuddhādvaita), because, in his view, Advaita Vēdānta explains the problem of phenomenal existence based on two mutually different and independent entities. The first entity is known as brahman, the pure consciousness, and the second is avidyā or inexplicable ignorance. Both are said to be beginninglessly existent. For this reason, Vallabhācārya taking māyā as the paver of Brahman does not consider Advaita Vēdānta to be pure monism.
Abhinavagupta, the great eleventh-century sage of Kashmir Shaivism, also finds several logical and psychological defects in Shankara’s school of Vēdāntic monism and therefore calls his monism Parādvaita or absolute non-dualism. He uses this term specifically to differentiate it from Advaita Vēdānta, which he thoroughly examines and criticizes in several of his works. An example can be found in his īśvarapratyabhijñā vivr̥ti-vimarśinī where he says, the principle of the absolute existence of Brahman, along with avidyā as his upādhi (an adventitious element attached to Him), cannot be accepted as a definite principle of pure Advaita, because it implies the eternal existence of two entities, Brahman and Universal ignorance. This amounts, according to him, to clear dualism. Criticizing the principle of avidyā as being the source of creation, Abhinavagupta says:
There is a self-contradiction in saying that avidyā is indescribable and in describing it as the entity that assumes the whole infinitely varied display of phenomena. To say that finite beings are deluded by the beginningless ignorance brought about by avidyā implies that such a power is surely describable, and it is actually described in that way. Besides, a non-substantial entity could not have the capacity to manifest such an extraordinary show. If it is really capable of creating, then it must be a truly existent entity and not apparent and indescribable.
At the very beginning of that voluminous work, he also criticizes another theory of creation, the principle of false appearance (vivarta). This theory has two aspects. First, it can refer to the appearance of some non-existent phenomenon like a dream or a mirage. According to this aspect, the universe does not exist, but only appears as an existent reality. Vivarta can also refer to the appearance of something that is other than it seems, as when a rope is mistaken for a snake or a shell for silver. According to this aspect of vivarta, Brahman exists but appears falsely as God, finite soul, and insentient matter. In Abhinavagupta’s words:
It has been said that vivarta is the manifestation of an unreal entity. How can it be unreal when it is manifested? This anomaly has not been given due consideration.
To sum up, Abhinavagupta is saying that an entity that appears clearly and creates the whole universe must be something real and substantial and should be describable as much.
In his commentary on Parātriśikā, Abhinavagupta insists that his philosophic view about the creative nature of absolute reality should not be confused with the views of either Sāmkhya or Vēdānta, as it is specifically a Shaiva view. Explaining the creative nature of Brahman, he says:
Brahman is one compact whole, that power of bliss that projects itself externally by a kind of spilling out of universal creative potency lying within. Infinite Consciousness gets evolved into all phenomenal existence just as the word Brahman means both the all-pervading infinite and the evolved entity.
Comparing these views on brahman with those of Advaita Vēdānta, he adds:
The Brahman of Shaivism is not the same as that of Advaita Vēdānta which comes very close to the final principle of nihilistic Buddhism.
Discussing this issue in īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī, he criticizes both the Advaita Vēdāntins and the teachers of Buddhist idealism, known as Vijñānavādins, when he says:
Finding the contradiction between unity and diversity quite irreconcilable, some thinkers (i.e. Vēdāntins) stated that apparent diversity was inexplicable because of its being basic ignorance (avidyā), while other (i.e. Buddhists) said that diversity was false because it was an outcome of mental ideation (samvr̥ti). Thus both of them deceived themselves and others as well.
In another context in the same work, he discusses the topic in considerable detail and argues as follows:
If it is argued that the unity of absolute Consciousness and that (the appearance) of diversity is due to the disturbance caused by avidyā, then it is not possible to resolve who is responsible for the defect of avidyā. For on the other hand, how could Brahman, who is pure knowledge, assume the form of ignorance?
Abhinavagupta refuses to accept avidyā as an inexplicable entity. He argues:
If avidyā is said to be inexplicable, it is not clear to us for whom it is inexplicable. On the one hand, its essential character becomes manifest, and, on the other hand, it is said to be an indescribable entity. How absurd is it? If this means that its existence cannot be explained or justified through logical arguments, then we ask what kind of logic is it that could contradict direct experience? How can an entity, which shines in experience, be unjustifiable?
Next, Abhinavagupta introduces a supposition about creation characteristic of Advaita Vēdānta:
Brahman, the pure Consciousness, shines alone as an existent truth in nirvikalpa cognition, a direct experience free from ideation, and phenomenal diversity appears as a result of mental ideation.
He refutes this argument as follows:
Who conducts such ideation? If Brahman conducts it, He becomes stained by avidyā. None other than He exists, so who else could conduct it?
A further argument on this point is then presented:
How can a distinction be established that knowledge without ideation is real while knowledge with ideation is false when both of them shine with equal brilliance?
The Advaitins might finally attempt to take shelter in the authority of Vedic scriptures, but Abhinavagupta refutes this also as follows:
If it is argued that unity is established on the basis of scriptural authority with disregard for mundane knowledge, then it is pointed out here that scriptures themselves hold authority in the field of diversity and have diversity as their character.
The whole discussion is finally concluded by Abhinavagupta in the following passage:
If the absolute monistic existence of pure Consciousness is accepted, then its independent activity of bearing diverse forms cannot be explained at all. But all this can be justified and explained if it is accepted as endowed with freedom in the form of Self-awareness.
This is how Abhinavagupta presents and discusses the views of Shankarācārya’s school of Advaita Vēdānta. One can easily understand why Abhinavagupta felt the need to differentiate the non-dualism of Kashmir Shaivism from the apparent monism of the followers of Shankarācārya while coining the term Parādvaita in the process of these debates.
It should be pointed out that the main difference between the Vēdāntic monism discussed and accepted by Shankarācārya, and the Parādvaita developed by the exponents of Kashmir Shaivism is probably more a difference of logic than of faith. As we have already seen, Vēdāntic teachers place the source of phenomenal existence outside of absolute Consciousness and view its creative power as dependent on the external element of avidyā, while Parādvaita exponents insist that this creative power is the essential nature of absolute Consciousness and the source of all phenomenal manifestation.
Since Shankara and Gauḍapāda were interested in refuting Buddhist logic, they studied it thoroughly and in the process seem to have become influenced by many of the Buddhist arguments. Since the above-mentioned shortcomings in their philosophical approach were also present in the logic of their main opponents, the Buddhist logicians, the Advaitins ignored them and made no attempt to refute them. After all, debaters need not pay attention to inconsistencies held in common.
It should also be noted that Shankarācārya did not live long enough for his logical thinking to possibly reach full maturity. Further, most of the prominent post-Shankara Advaitins ignored the works of the great Vēdāntic teachers on practical aspects of the philosophy and concentrated instead on their logical works. These later Advaitins focussed mainly on debating and logic instead of practicing the philosophy in order to experience an actual realization of brahman, śrīharṣa, one of the greatest Vēdāntic logicians, goes so far as to boastfully declare his preference for logical debate over the practice.
The tendency to primarily and majorly focus only on the intricacies of logical argumentation caused Advaita Vēdānta to drift towards a point very close to the nihilism of the Buddhists. It was because of this trend in Advaita philosophy that Abhinavagupta felt the need to clarify the theistic and absolutist monism of Kashmir Shaivism which had been previously discovered and developed by Sōmānanda and Utpaladeva.
Although there is no doubt that the seeds of such nihilistic thinking are present in the passages of some important logical works of Shankarācārya, still, his prominent works on practical Vēdānta deserve due consideration, as does his young age during the period in which he composed the commentaries on the Prasthānatrayī.
It is with an open-minded approach to the basic principles of other schools of philosophy that Abhinavagupta states in his īśvarapratyabhijñā vivr̥itivimarśinī, “If a Vēdāntic aspirant identifies avidyā with māyā and takes the latter as the divine potency of Brahman, he also can attain the highest perfection”. He makes similar remarks about Lord Buddha’s teachings and lays the burden of the blame for any logical confusion on the later commentators.
According to this supreme monism of Abhinavagupta, absolute I-consciousness is the only entity that exists. It is infinite, eternal, perfect, and pure Consciousness, endowed with divine creative power. This creative power is essentially vibrant in nature and is actively engaged in the manifestation of relative unity and all diversity. The term “relative unity” is used here because manifested unity has only relative oneness when compared to the absolute unity of infinite I-consciousness in which all creation is considered to be present and absolutely real. A perfect yogin, established in Parādvaita, sees one Absolute God in all diversity and unity. In this philosophy, diversity is not considered to be an illusion like the son of a barren woman but is as real as relative unity. Absolute reality itself shines in both the manifestations of relative unity and diversity. As Abhinavagupta says:
It is not being said that diversity does not exist at all in this (understanding of) non-dualism. The manifestation of diversity has been accepted even in that which is devoid of all differentiation (Mālinīvijayavārttika).
This divine creative power is the basic and essential nature of monistic I-consciousness. In their exploration of consciousness during deep states of meditation, Shaiva yogins discovered that this divine essence was infinitely blissful and playful as well as vibrant. Because of its divine and playful nature, ancient philosophers called it Paramaśiva.
Creation, preservation, absorption, obscuration, and revelation are the five main acts in the divine play of the Lordship of Paramaśiva. He creates, preserves, and absorbs all phenomena. In the process, He conceals his real nature and appears as finite beings. He causes these beings to become increasingly identified with their limited individual egos. After undergoing births and deaths in innumerable species, He finally realizes his true nature of lordship, thus concluding his divine play. All this is the manifestation of His divine power and is not anyway different from Him. This, a finite being is not different from the Supreme, who is simply hiding in this form. In the words of Abhinavagupta:
But Almighty Lord, being able to do even the impossible, and possessing pure independence, is skilled in playfully concealing His real Self (Tantrāloka).
According to this absolute non-dualism of Parādvaita, He and He alone exists in all the various scenes of this play. All creation has its real and eternal existence within the Supreme in the form of divine potency of His pure consciousness. Once creation becomes manifested as apparent phenomenal existence, it has a beginning and an end. Even so, perfect yogins see only the existence of one Absolute Supreme Lord in both the apparent phenomenal existence and the pure existence of absolute Consciousness. Shiva-yogins must not only know this truth, but they also have to actually experience it as well. Then and then alone do they attain perfect and complete Self-realization.
The Supreme is supreme in both His and phenomenal aspects. A poet is a poet even when he is in deep sleep. A Supreme ruler, though involved in mundane activities or quietly resting, is still a ruler. Similarly, He remans fully Himself, complete with His divine power, even when He appears in His noumenal aspect. Therefore, it is due to His essential nature that He is the Lord, not because of His relation with phenomenal existence. This is the main difference between the Advaita approach of Shankarācārya and the Parādvaita approach of Abhinavagupta.
Brahman, while appearing as all phenomena, does not undergo any change or transformation – called pariṇāma, according to post-Shankara Vēdāntins. According to Abhinavagupta, all phenomenal manifestations take place in the manner of a reflection. He teaches realism (satkāryavāda), but his realism is neither a material realism nor does it involve any process of pariṇāma. All of the creation is merely an outward reflection of the divine powers of Brahman. His powers shine in Him as “I” but their outward reflections appear as “this”. This is the secret of the reality of all phenomena. In this way, the satkāryavāda of Abhinavagupta can be considered a form of spiritual realism. All creation is the materialization of the divine will of brahman. It is a wonderful and divine transmutation brought about by Paramaśiva through His own free will.
There is nothing lacking in His playful nature because He is not only full but overflowing (paripūrṇa). All the external manifestations of Paramaśiva’s divine potency spill out from this blissful fullness. He projects His powers outward not because of any need, but because it is the basic nature of His infinite and divine potency to do so. A person may ask why this is His nature, but it is useless to question or challenge the essential nature of a thing. It would be absurd to ask why fire is warm, or why it shines, or why it burns, and so on. Fire, devoid of such qualities, would, quite simply, cease to be fire. Similarly, Brahman, devoid of the vibrant manifestation of his divine creative power, would be reduced to the position of an insentient entity. In the words of Abhinavagupta:
If Almighty Lord had remained forever in one form, He would have to give up His consciousness and creative power, thus becoming an insentient article like an earthen water vessel.
The manifestation of contradictory concepts like bondage and liberation, relative unity and diversity, ignorance and knowledge, etc., are simply parts of Brahman’s divine play. Abhinavagupta says:
These twin concepts of bondage and liberation are the essential character of Almighty Lord, because, in fact, the concept of differences does not exist in Him at all (Bōdhapañcadaśikā).
Another difference between Advaita and Parādvaita approach is that while Advaitins can experience true monism only in the state of samādhi, Parādvaitins experience it even during mundane transactions. Because of this, Narasimhagupta, the father of Abhinavagupta, called it Pratyakṣādvaita, immediate (perceived) non-dualism. As Abhinavagupta says:
The great teacher, Narasimhagupta, having ripened his intellect in the art of correct contemplation, calls this the non-dualism that can be perceived through one’s external sense (Mālinīvijayavārtika).
Abhinavagupta uses a special type of logical reasoning that he calls sattarka. All prevalent logic (tarka) is based on those conventions that have evolved out of the mundane experiences of people working within the usual confines of the mind and emotions. By contrast, sattarka is based on the intuitive experiences of yogins who transcend limited existence and experience reality at the plane of unity in diversity (vidyā).
Abhinavagupta teaches that an insentient object cannot prove or assert its existence through its own power, but requires the help of a sentient being to witness it and to say that it exists. This brings to mind Berkeley’s famous dilemma of the tree falling in the forest. If no sentient being is present, does the tree falling make a noise? The Kashmir Shaivite would say, “Yes. There is noise because it all happens within and is witnessed by Absolute consciousness”.
In this philosophy, sentience alone is said to have an independent existence. It proceeds to some insentient object, assumes its form, and appears as that object as well. The manifested insentient object itself is thus considered real. However, such an object is considered to be in a more real and pure form when it shines within the consciousness of some living being where that object can actually be said to exist. Finally, the insentient object is eternal and therefore absolutely real (paramārthasat) only with infinite Consciousness itself. Whether finite or infinite, it is consciousness alone that can appear as a knowing subject. This proves two things: a. Consciousness alone has an independent existence, and b. Consciousness alone shines.
This approach to the truth through the intuitive vision of unity in diversity clarifies the non-dualism of divinely potent Consciousness and shows that this consciousness has the power to assume the forms of unconscious entities and to shine in their forms as well. As Abhinavagupta says:
Therefore, only the ātman shines (everywhere) taking as its form the whole objective existence known as the universe, and appearing as all this without any break. The object, being itself of the nature of consciousness, is also wholly immersed in the light (of consciousness); since the ultimate truth is merely that the light (of consciousness) shines, what distinction could there be between omniscience and its absence? (īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī with Bhāskarī)
Here Abhinavagupta shows that the supposed difference between finite and infinite consciousness is commonly based on the phenomenal existence of the objects of consciousness such as the body, senses, and the brain. However, because these objects owe their existence to, and emerge out of, Consciousness itself, they can hardly be capable of forming sound judgments about that Consciousness.
Instead of depending on conventional logic, sattarka is based on the authority of intuitive experiences of supreme monism realized during the practice of Yoga. The views and teachings of Abhinavagupta may initially be considered illogical by certain scholars of Western philosophy, but exposure to this method might also lead them to take a closer look at the essence of their own form of logic, which depends solely on the mind and the mind’s ideation for its authority.
There is an important difference between Indian darśana and Western philosophy. Basically, Indian philosophy (darśana) derives from intuitive realizations of truths, while books dealing with these truths are considered darśanas in a secondary sense. In Indian darśanas, logic is used only in the writings of this secondary form in order to present and debate the truths gleaned during the Yogic experience. By contrast in the West, philosophy is basically a tradition of worldly wisdom and logic developed through ordinary intellectual abilities. Because there is no Yogic practice involved, this use of the intellect is essentially the only method that Western philosophy has for arriving at truths.
Abhinavagupta explains the Parādvaita principle of Kashmir Shaivism at several places in his prominent works and discusses it from several points of view. In his opinion, scriptural passages which express this principle do not need to employ the inclusive/exclusive implication method (bhāgatyāga lakṣaṇa) as commentary or explanation. He says:
Just as students not acquainted with certain synonyms are taught as follows – a pādapa (tree) is a bhūruha, and a ghaṭa (pot) is a Kumbha, so it is said that the Almighty Lord is this whole phenomenon (Mālinīvijayavārtika).
By this, he simply means that the ‘definition’ of Supreme does not add any new predicate about Him, but simply substitutes a synonym – like saying a “rug” is a “carpet”.
Parādvaita neither accepts diversity nor rejects it totally. Though diversity is not an absolute reality, yet it has its roots in such a reality. Abhinavagupta says:
The absolute monism is that principle which neither refutes nor establishes diversity (Mālinīvijayavārttika)
He asserts that no apparent diversity can in any way disturb the absolute unity of the Lord Who shines brilliantly due to the blissful luster of His pure consciousness.
Adopting the view of supreme non-dualism, Abhinavagupta says that Parādvaita is the principle wherein monism, dualism and mono-dualism appear equally as the manifestations of one and the same divine reality:
The real non-dualism is that philosophical view that sees only one Truth in diverse statements like, ‘this is diversity, this is non-diversity, that is unity, and, this is both diversity and unity”.
According to Abhinavagupta, a yogin who is established in the understanding and experience of supreme non-dualism, sees only one reality shining in all mutually opposite entities like pleasure and pain, bondage and liberation, sentience and insentience, and so on, just as an ordinary person sees both a ghaṭa and kumbha as only one thing expressed through different words (Tantrālōka).
Seeing through the lens of supreme monism, Abhinavagupta says that the Lord can appear as anything and everything in the universe because He enjoys full independence and is capable of bringing about even the impossible. Elucidating this principle further, he says that the Lord shines Himself in different ways as (1) uncovered truth, (2) disguised truth, and (3) partly hidden truth. Emphasizing the principle of supreme non-dualism, he says that the single absolute Consciousness, being endowed with independent creative power, appears itself in wonderfully varied forms. He adds that it is pure Consciousness alone that appears in the form of all different phenomena.
Aside from the differences with Shankara’s Advaita Vēdānta discussed earlier, Parādvaita should also not be confused with the Bhēdābhēda or Viśiṣṭādvaita principles of Shaiva and Vaiṣṇava schools of Southern India for the following reasons:
1. Parādvaita maintains an absolutist view in its metaphysics and ontology and this is not popular with śuddhādvaitins like Vallabha, or with Viśiṣṭādvaitins like Rāmānuja, śrīkaṇṭha, etc., Bhēdābhēdavādins like Nimbārka and Chaitanya, along with the Shaiva Siddhāntins do not support absolution either.
2. According to Abhinavagupta, Paramaśiva is not some form of personal God living in a superior heavenly abode like Vaikunṭha, Gōlōka, Kailāsa, Vr̥ndāvana or Rudralōka. All these abodes, along with their divine masters, are simply the playful creations of Paramaśiva. As already seen, He produces these abodes by means of the reflective manifestations of His divine powers. By definition these creations have a beginning and an end; only Paramaśiva is eternal.
3. The final liberation in the Parādvaita view is a state of perfect and absolute unity far more profound than even the highest type of sāyujya or sālōkya – the forms of liberation known to these other schools.
4. Creation by Paramaśiva involves no transformation (pariṇāma) either in Paramaśiva or his Supreme śakti. It is instead a transmutation that causes no change whatsoever in the source.
5. The Parādvaita of Kashmir Shaivism does not accept any kind of svagatabheda or an inferior variety of Paramaśiva that impairs his essential unity the way that the Viśiṣṭādvaitins, for example, see this variety in their eternal truth, which they call Nārāyaṇa.
6. The Parādvaita of Kashmir Shaivism is clearly a logical non-dualism because it sees only one absolute reality in all phenomenal and noumenal entities. It sees perfect unity even in mundane transactions. The mind of a Parādvaitin becomes double-edged. It conducts worldly transactions through its outward edge and remains immersed in the absolute unity through its inward edge. Great royal sages like Janaka and śrīkr̥ṣṇa are examples of yogins who have been described as established in Parādvaita.